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Grassroots Report 
Conf rooting Middle East Issues 
MELANI McALISTER 
During the past year, Boston 
Mobilization for Survival has spon-
sored several introductory courses on 
the Middle East. The first, "Women 
Demystifying the Middle East,'' was 
facilitated by two feminists who felt 
that women were often shut out of 
discussions about the Middle East by 
''male experts preaching the word.'' 
Jennifer Bing and Jenny Linger led two 
different discussion groups that aimed 
to bring the Middle East onto the agen-
da of feminist activists. Another 
course, on ''US Policy in the Middle 
East,'' was taught by Mobilization 
Middle East Task Force members last 
spring. That four week course was aim-
ed at activists (anti-intervention, gay 
and lesbian, disarmament) who were 
interested in getting a basic understan-
ding of the Arab/Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict. The course was filled, with a 
waiting list, and-interestingly-most 
of the participants were women. 
The remarks in this article were 
derived from conversations with the 
facilitators of the Women Demystify-
ing course, my own experience with the 
US Policy course, and discussions and 
conversations with other Middle East 
activists. 
The Middle East, and the Arab/ 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict in par-
ticular, has-until relatively 
recently-been studiously ignored by 
most of the peace movement. Even as 
''the movement'' has grown from 
Continued on page Two (~' Ellen Shub 
Middle East Issues 
Continuftl Jrom PDI~ On~ 
"anti-war" to "anti-nuke" to a more 
comprehensive "peace with justice" 
movement, and even as the left has 
begun to clearly articulate the ''deadly 
connection'' between US intervention 
and nuclear war, the Middle East has 
remained noticeably off the 
agenda-"too difficult," "too com-
plex," "too hot to handle." 
The silence around the Middle East 
has less to do with lack of information 
(the so-called media blackout), or with 
the complexity of issues (the Middle 
East is objectively no more difficult to 
understand than any other issue pro-
gressive activists have to grapple with) 
than with a convergence of benign 
neglect, political convenience, and 
deep-rooted emotional barriers. In the 
face of the obvious importance of the 
region as the world's major recipient of 
US military aid and the most likely 
flashpoint for nuclear war, the costs of 
maintaining a "safe" silence have 
become increasingly unbearable. 
On the face of it, the Arab/Israeli/ 
Palestinian conflict is an easy one to ig-
nore. On the one hand, the region is 
half a world away and, for most Amer-
icans, there has been little to bring 
it home. Until recently perhaps, 
there has been a sense that these are not 
really our problems: there have been 
few refugees in our midst; our children 
aren't having nightmares; very few 
Americans have been killed (the 
Marines in. Lebanon were the excep-
tion, and the relative absence of public 
outcry is indicative). On the other 
hand, there is a powerful feeling of 
identification with Israel. This goes 
beyond the hegemony of the ''pro-
Israel'' perspective in the mainstream 
media and politics to a sense that 
Israelis are ''like us'' in a way that 
other Middle Easterners are decidedly 
not: Israel is portrayed as essentially a 
Western culture; Israelis are secular, 
pragmatic people with whom we share 
a common Judea-Christian ethic; the 
place is well-managed, the travel is 
pleasant, the food is good. Beyond 
that, many of us in the peace move-
ment are attracted by the notion that 
Israel is a socialist, democratic, even 
feminist haven. Israel was founded as a 
socialist state. It was an experiment in 
putting ideals into practice: the kibbut-
zim, the collective working of the land, 
''making the desert bloom.'' Those im-
ages, combined with the fact that an 
active and significant part of the left 
has historically been strongly (though 
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not uncritically) pro-Zionist, has made 
the Palestinian issue, prima facie, 
unusually difficult and potentially 
divisive for the peace movement. 
At the risk of over-simplification, I 
will argue that the barriers for progres-
sives in doing Middle East work are at 
least three: fears that criticisms of 
Israel are anti-Semitic; an anti-Arab 
racism that is so pervasive and ac-
cepted as to often be invisible; 
and-for the women's movement in 
particular-concerns raised about the 
oppression of women in Islamic/ Arab 
countries. 
Anti-Semitism 
There is a s~nse, perhaps especially 
among those who are new to the issue 
or among folks who have strong emo-
tional ties to Israel, that criticism of 
Israel is inevitably anti-Semitic. Both 
Zionists and non-Zionists, for very dif-
ferent reasons, have set up the equa-
tion: Israel equals Jews; all Jews iden-
tify with Israel. The politically power-
ful corollary: criticism of Israel is tan-
tamount to anti-Semitism. For pro-
gressives, the suggestion of anti-
Semitism is a powerful silencer; 
that-combined with the almost 
universal "frie_nd of Israel" fervor in 
this country-creates an atmosphere in 
which many people don't have the con-
fidence to speak, or even to ask ques-
tions, about the Israeli/Palestinian 
question. 
While the issue, for Jews and non-
Jews alike, is US policy toward Israel, 
the Palestinians, and the Middle East, 
it is more often framed as our relation 
to Jews and anti-Semitism. The 
tendency to uncritically support Israel, 
or to avoid Middle East issues 
altogether, becomes a convenient way 
of trying to prove to ourselves and 
others that we aren't anti-Semitic, or 
"self-hating Jews." By allowing the 
conditions of the debate to be so 
distorted, we may avoid painful con-
frontations, but we also lose the ability 
to ask the crucial questions (for this 
region as any other): Who has the right 
to critically examine American policy? 
Whose interests are being furthered by 
that policy? How can we put forth an 
alternative that could help create a just 
peace in the region? Paralyzed by the 
fear that our motives for raising these 
questions are suspect, the issues are 
never addressed. 
The history of the Jews as a perse-
cuted people plays a powerful role in 
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this. The Crusades, the Holocaust, the 
Ku Klux Klan-the entire history of 
Jewish oppression should give us 
pause. The concern-that we don't fall 
into the trap of "blaming the Jews" 
again -is well-founded. The 
response-that the Zionist answer to 
this persecution is the only legitimate 
one; that the "Jewish state" as it is 
presently constituted is the only solu-
tion; and that this state must be above 
and beyond our usual criticisms of 
government policies-is both mis-
guided and counter-productive. To 
identify Israel as the sole representa-
tion or embodiment of Judaism is 
simply not accurate, as Jews inside and 
outside Israel will testify. Perhaps 
more importantly, Israel is a diverse 
nation of many competing parties and 
political tendencies, some of which 
have been quite outspoken about the 
untenability and the immorality of 
their government's policy. In fact, it is 
interesting to note that the range of 
issues up for debate and the number of 
acceptable approaches to the Palesti-
nian conflict is much broader for the 
Israeli Left than for the peace move-
ment in the United States. 
We must recognize, however, that 
there are instances in which anti-
Zionism has been used as a cover for 
anti-Semitism, both by Arabs and by 
certain sectors in the United States and 
Europe. If one hates Jews, the self-
Continued on page Six 
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THE INTERVENTION 
CONSENSUS: 
Some Lessons From Vietnam 
FRANK BRODHEAD 
Does the U.S. role in deposing 
Philippines president Ferdinand Mar-
cos mark a change in U.S. foreign 
policy? The toppling of the Marcos 
dictatorship by the mass, nonviolent 
action of the Filipino people must sure-
ly be one of the most inspiring events 
of our era. Yet the lessons to be drawn 
from these events are shrouded in 
ambiguity. 1 What are we to make of 
the image contrived for President 
Reagan as a scourge of dictators? Is the 
United States, as a result of the 
benefits it has accrued in permitting the 
toppling of Marcos and Haiti's "Baby 
Doc'' Duvalier, likely to support a 
populist (though noncommunist) 
"third force" in Chile, South Korea, 
or Indonesia, akin to the movement 
that brought Mrs. Aquino to power in 
the Philippines? Or is the "Reagan 
Doctrine'' -the assertion that the 
United States will rollback Third 
World revolutions by any means neces-
sary-st ill alive and well in 
Washington? And if it is, what does 
this mean for U .S.-Filipino relations? 
The purpose of this essay is to bring 
to these questions some of the ''lessons 
of Vietnam.'' The Vietnam era has 
given us a great storehouse of data on 
the rhetoric and realities of US im-
-perial management. While the rele-
vance of this experience for our situa-
tion today is not always clear, the vast 
amount of published information 
about decision making during the Viet-
nam war often gives us a helpful start-
ing point to analyze current develop-
ments. 
The Reagan Doctrine and the 
''Philippine Corollary'' 
As enunciated in a presidential 
speech in 1985, the Reagan Doctrine 
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promises U.S. support for the over-
throw of left-wing regimes, even if 
this means supporting armed counter-
revolution, as in Nicaragua. The Doc-
trine deemphasizes arms control 
measures with the Soviet Union, plac-
ing a higher priority on resolving 
"regional conflicts" on terms favor-
able to U.S. interests. In plain lang-
uage, it focuses East-West policy on 
gaining victories in Nicaragua, Angola, 
Cambodia, and Afghanistan. It pro-
mises ''counterrevolution without 
frontiers.'' 
On March 14, 1986, in the wake of 
the Aqino victory, President Reagan 
stated that U.S. policy was to oppose 
rightwing dictators as well as leftwing 
regimes. The hawkish New Republic 
saw the speech as establishing a 
"Philippine Corollary," in which the 
United States now recognizes that its 
interests can also be advanced by "cen-
trist" regimes emerging out of the col-
lapse of rightwing dictatorships. 2 In-
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deed, for many leading opponents of 
the Reagan administration, the Aquino 
victory in the Philippines has become 
the most visible symbol of their belief 
that the United States could (and 
should) intervene "to do good." Thus 
the "Philippine Corollary" helps to 
broaden support for U.S. intervention. 
U.S. intervention can be sold to the U.S. 
public not simply as anti-leftist, but as 
pro-centrist; not simply as against 
revolution, but for democracy as well. 
The "Third Force" in Vietnam 
In its editorial on the "Philippine 
Corollary,'' the New Repubic claimed 
that the Reagan Doctrine was the ''heir 
to the liberal internationalism of the 
postwar era, as enunciated in the Tru-
man Doctrine and as understood 
through Kennedy until the Vietnam 
War." Reagan's March 14 speech, ac-
cording to the New Republic, "pre-
sents a reprise of that vision: a neo-
internationalist, ideologically based 
foreign policy, resting on the premise 
that the promotion of democracy satis-
fies both American interests and 
values." 
While the New Republic is un-
doubtedly correct in viewing Reagan's 
foreign policy as the legitimate heir to 
Cold War liberalism, it errs in seeing 
the Vietnam era as a break-rather 
than as a continuity-in Cold War 
liberalism. As an important new study 
by George McT. Kahin makes clear, 3 it 
was Kennedy and (after his death) the 
Camelot team that charted the path of 
counterrevolutionary war in Vietnam 
and sold it to Lyndon Johnson. More 
to the point, it was also Kennedy and 
his advisors who set the United States 
against the emergence of a populist but 
noncommunist political force. 
The regime established (illegally) by 
the United States in South Vietnam 
after the 1954 Geneva Conference was 
Continued on page Four 
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entrusted to the care of Ngo Dinh 
Diem. Diem was a Catholic-but Viet-
nam was an overwhelmingly Buddhist 
country. It was from the Vietnamese 
Catholics that the French colonialists 
had drawn the bulk of its quislings and 
collaborators. It was also from the 
Catholics (as well as from the military 
and the bureaucracy) that Diem drew 
his initial base of support. Thus it is 
not surprising that a coalition of Bud-
dhist organizations became, after the 
National Liberation Front, the focus 
of anti-Diem and anti-U .S. sentiment 
in South Vietnam.4 For three years, 
from mid-1963 to mid-1966, the Bud-
dhist movement served as a potential 
vehicle through which the United 
States could transfer its allegiance 
from a rightwing dictator to a noncom-
munist "third force." Yet Cold War 
liberalism, under both Kennedy and 
Johnson, consistently rejected the op-
tion of such a third force. Both presi-
dencies preferred to change govern-
ments as often as necessary in order to 
find one which would stand firm 
against demands for a U.S. withdrawal 
and an end to the war, which by the 
mid-1960s were coming from all ranks 
of South Vietnamese society. 
The Buddhists were galvanized to ac-
tion, first, by the harsh repression of 
the Diem regime in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, and then by the sudden 
ban on the celebration of Buddha's 
birthday in May 1963. Protest led to a 
massacre by government troops, and 
repression led to a bad press for Diem 
in the United States and pressure to 
ease up. But Diem, claiming that the 
Buddhists were NLF agents, was soon 
back at it, and martial law was impos-
ed in August. Fearing that Diem's use-
fulness was finally at an end, and 
angered because the Diem family had 
been detected opening negotiations 
with the NLF, Kennedy gave the green 
light for a coup. Diem was killed and 
replaced by the largely unknown Gen. 
Minh. 
Gen. Minh and his supporters soon 
proved to be completely unreliable, 
failing to follow U.S. advice. "Even 
more alarming," notes Prof. Kahin, 
''was the possibility that they might 
negotiate a 'neutralist' solution involv-
ing an end to the fighting and a com-
promise agreement with the National 
Liberation Front" (182). Minh, more-
over, began moving toward the Bud-
dhists, who had formed a unified 
organization at the end of 1963. The 
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dangers of peace were exacerbated by 
growing international pressures, 
especially from France, for settling the 
war through some kind of neutraliza-
tion formula. Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara feared that ''cur-
rent trends, unless reversed in the next 
2-3 months, will lead to neutralization 
at best and more likely to a 
Communist-controlled state" (193). In 
short, Minh would have to go. He was 
replaced by Gen. Khanh in a 
U .S.-organized coup at the end of 
January 1964. 
The U.S. attitude toward Gen. 
Khanh was initially very favorable. 
Khanh was described by McNamara as 
"highly responsive to U.S. advice." 
Nevertheless, according to the Penta-
gon Papers, "[Ambassador Maxwell] 
Taylor feared the GVN [Khanh's 
government] might get tired and want 
to negotiate if they could not get the 
U.S. more involved" (cited 215). Bom-
bing the North was initially intended to 
shore up the flagging morale of the 
South. Khanh was told in July, for ex-
ample, that the U.S. government "had 
considered attacks that might begin 
. . . if the pressure from dissident 
South Vietnamese factions became too 
great" (217). The fabricated Tonkin 
Gulf incident of August 1964 provided 
the pretext for this action. 
The bombing of the North was un-
popular in the South. In defiance of a 
declared state of emergency, protests 
by the Buddhists intensified, and 
Khanh began to lose support within the 
South Vietnamese military. Con-
fronted also with growing criticism 
from Washington, Khanh suddenly 
turned to the organized Buddhists for 
support. This set off alarm bells in 
Washington; the CIA cabled that 
"Khanh had 'in effect put his govern-
ment completely in the hands of [Bud-
dhist leader] Tri Quang' ''; and that 
Khanh intended to ask Tri Quang to 
form a government by November 1 
(234). This would mean an end to the 
U.S. presence in Vietnam. 
'' Among Americans in both 
Washington and Saigon," notes Prof. 
Kahin, ''the belief became more and 
more widespread that the formidable 
mass backing obtained by the Buddhist 
leaders was basically dependent upon 
their espousal of neutralist goals-an 
end to the fighting and a negotiated 
peace with the NLF, followed by a 
coalition government" (234). "The 
abiding problem for American of-
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ficials," states Kahin, "was that the 
more broadly based and responsible to 
public opinion a Saigon government 
became, the less disposed it would be 
to continue with the fighting, and the 
greater the popular pressure it would 
be under to negotiate a neutralist 
political settlement incompatible with 
any continuing U.S. presence" (238). 
This is the dilemma faced today by 
the U.S. counterrevolutionary project 
throughout the world. Only a strong 
nationalist movement can provide the 
United States with a platform from 
which it can def eat the guerrillas on the 
left. But a nationalist movement with 
genuine roots among the peasantry and 
the urban lower classes seems to turn 
inevitably into a vehicle for national 
self-determination, and asks the 
United States to leave! 
In early 1965, to head off the immi-
nent prospect of the formation of a 
neutralist government under Buddhist 
influence or leadership, the United 
States began the sustained bombing of 
the North. But this only increased in-
stability in the South. Two days after 
the February 7 attack on the U.S. 
forces at Pleiku, which served as the 
pretext for the U.S. bombing of the 
North, Ambassador Taylor sent the 
following cable to Washington: 
Increasing indications that Buddhist 
Institute orchestrating strong anti-
American campaign with neutralist 
overtones, evidently to picture U.S. 
presence and interference as main 
obstacle to peace in Vietnam and pre-
sent selves as only independent group 
capable of leading Vietnamese people 
to settlement of conflict without 
heavy intensification of war effort. 
Institute leadership apparently play-
ing on what they feel is widespread 
popular desire for peace, as well as 
on latent nationalism of younger 
generation in particular. (288) 
Within weeks Gen. Khanh was ousted 
in yet another U .S.-organized coup. 
Khanh was replaced by a govern-
ment which soon came to be headed by 
Generals Ky and Thieu, who were to 
guide the fortunes of Vietnam until the 
collapse in 1975. Unlike their 
predecessors, Ky and Thieu raised no 
questions about the U.S. military 
build-up, and even suggested ways in 
which the war could be expanded. 
With the ensuing U.S. invasion, which 
quickly brought the number of U.S. 
troops in Vietnam to 400,000, the last 
chapter in the sad story of Vietnam's 
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.. third force" began. 
The organized Buddhists understood 
that peace could only be achieved if the 
Americans were to leave. Recognizing 
that they could not directly confront 
U.S. military power, the Buddhist 
movement agitated for an elected 
legislative assembly. The newly elected 
leaders, reasoned the Buddhists, would 
be in a position to negotiate with the 
NLF to end the war. Cognizant of the 
dangers such an election would pose, 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, 
''with the backing of most top officials 
in the Johnson administration, remain-
ed determined to avoid elections until 
after the war had been won, or at least 
until after the Saigon military were 
solidly and unchallengeably in 
control" (414). 
The showdown between the Bud-
dhist movement and the U.S. occupiers 
began in early 1966, when the Bud-
dhists put themselves at the head of a 
protest movement aimed at stopping 
the ouster of the popular Gen. Thi, the 
(Buddhist) military commander of 
South Vietnam's five northernmost 
provinces, which included the cities of 
Danang and Hue. ''Throughout most 
of that area not under NLF control,'' 
notes Kahin, ''the movement now 
began to exert authority. And it called 
publicly not only for the prompt 
establishment of an interim legislative 
assembly and a clear-cut schedule for 
elections to a constituent assembly, but 
also for the end of the military's 
political leadership in Saigon" (418). 
To forestall such a disaster, Ky and 
Lodge promised elections, and then 
reneged on their promises once the pro-
tests began to ebb. Demonstrations 
were immediately renewed, but now 
they were directed explicitly at the 
United States as well as the military 
leadership. Hue Radio declared that 
"the rascals in Saigon are receiving 
orders from the White House and 
American Embassy in Saigon," and 
"the U.S. wants to conquer our coun-
try under the guise of helping to fight 
communism" (420-21). The revolt in 
the northern provinces became nearly 
total. "Never," notes Kahin, "had any 
South Vietnamese government stood 
more naked of indigenous backing. In 
the words of a retrospective U.S. in-
telligence assessment, there was an 
'almost total absence of any organized 
popular support, or even sympathy for 
the American-backed regime' " (421). 
The Saigon government struck back. 
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Aided directly by U.S. military forces 
in Danang and Saigon, Ky and Thieu 
began a sustained and bloody assault 
on the popular movement. U.S. air-
craft and ground forces were critical to 
the success of this operation, in which 
virtually the entire U.S. national 
security establishment was involved in 
its planning. The critical move was 
Ambassador Lodge's assurance to the 
Buddhists that elections would be held. 
Yet once calm was restored, Ky once 
again reneged on this promise, with 
Lodge's backing. A major military ex-
pedition was then launched against 
Danang on May 15. Operating from 
the U.S. base at Danang, Ky's planes 
bombed and strafed troops loyal to the 
Buddhist movement. U.S. troops 
blocked sympathetic military forces 
from coming to the aid of pro-
Buddhist troops in Danang. Ky then 
moved against the Buddhists in Saigon 
and Hue, with direct U.S. military sup-
port again being critical. 
These events marked the end of Viet-
nam's "third force." Whatever 
possibilities had existed that a noncom-
munist solution could be found in Viet-
nam had been eliminated. Henceforth, 
as Kahin notes, ''Vietnamese who lived 
in the Saigon-controlled areas remain-
ed convinced that the dominance of 
[Ky and Thieu] could not be contested 
so long as the United States stood 
solidly behind them; and that is 
precisely what both the Johnson and 
Nixon administrations did" (432). 
Conclusion 
Even if shaded with a Philippines 
Corollary, there are many problems 
with the up-dated Reagan Doctrine. 
One is that it does grave injustice to the 
basic facts to stuff Duarte, or Angola's 
Savimbi, or Turkey's Gen. Evren-to 
say nothing of the feudal tribesmen of 
Afghanistan or the Pol Pot forces of 
Kampuchea-into the mold of the 
"democratic center." A second pro-
blem is that no support is advanced to 
the democratic center of the 
U .S.-supported regimes in South 
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, or 
Pakistan, which remain off limits to 
the winds of change. Thirdly, the 
Philippines Corollary was enunciated 
only two days before Reagan's March 
16 speech urging Congress to support 
the contras, and it is understandable if 
some critics interpreted the renuncia-
tion of the now-long-gone Marcos as a 
ploy to gain votes for contra aid. 
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But seen in the light of the Vietnam 
experience, the U.S. quest for a "third 
force'' is a cruel deceit on both the 
U.S. public and on the noncommunist 
populists of the Third World. Suppos-
ed democratic centrists like Duarte in 
El Salvador and Cruz in his 
Washington "exile" are maintained 
only for their usefulness in selling U.S. 
military aid programs to Congress. 
Real centrist forces, like those in Viet-
nam, are recognized as threats to U.S. 
plans for their country and speedily 
deposed. 
It is likely that the Aquino regime in 
the Philippines will soon put this thesis 
to the test. If the United States follows 
the path that became well-worn in Viet-
nam, it will continue to support Mrs. 
Aquino only as long as she cooperates 
in the war against the guerrillas, and in 
giving support for U.S. military and 
economic interests in the region. If her 
government pursues a genuinely 
nationalist course, however, diverting 
her country's resources to the needs of 
its own people and attempting to pur-
sue an independent foreign policy, the 
United States will throw its support to 
the Filipino Thieus and Kys waiting in 
the wings. 
Frank Brodhead, a Resist board 
member, is an activist and author liv-
ing in Philadelphia. 
1. The nature of the Philippines 
"election coup, " the future of the 
Aquino government, and the means by 
which U.S. policies assisted in the 
ousting of Marcos remain ambiguous. 
For a discussion of these issues see my 
"The U.S. Media and the 'Election 
Coup' in the Philippines," Radical 
America, Volume 20, No. 1 (1986) 
2. "The Philippine Corollary," 
April 7, 1986. 
3. Intervention: How America 
Became Involved in Vietnam (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986). Page 
references in this essay are to Kah in 's 
study. 
4. Prior to the Tet Offensive of 1968, 
and to the Phoenix assassination pro-
gram of the late '60s and early '70s, it 
would not be far-fetched to call the Na-
tional Liberation Front (NLF) itself a 
"third force." Vietnamese Com-
munists stayed equidistant from the 
Soviet Union and China during the 
Sino-Soviet split; they learned from the 
bad experience of the Geneva Con-
Jerence that it could not trust them 
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proclaimed "Jewish state" is all too 
convenient a target for that hatred. 
Those of us on the Left must recognize 
that hidden anti-Semitism when it oc-
curs and condemn it, while at the same 
time not allowing the Israeli govern-
ment or its apologists to use those in-
stances as a pretext to stifle all 
criticism. There is-both in principle 
and practice-an important distinction 
between criticism of Israel, or even a 
critique of Zionism, and anti-
semitism. Despite attempts from both 
sides to blur it, that distinction is vital 
to maintain. In fact, the simplistic 
''support for Israel = support of the 
Jews" solution may allow people to 
avoid focusing on the very real anti-
Semitism that colors American society. 
(The neo-Nazis, the LaRouchites, the 
Klan, and the Christian Right are only 
the most blatant examples.) 
Both the US and Israeli governments 
benefit from the silence that the anti-
Israel = anti-Semitism equation en-
genders. As has been pointed out by 
friend and foe alike, Israel-whose 
economy and military are almost com-
pletely dependent on US aid-cham-
pions American ''interests'' in the 
Middle East. The US government's 
policy interests have been consistent: to 
keep the USSR out of the region, to 
prevent the rise of potentially anti-
American Arab nationalism, to main-
tain control of oil. If the US can clothe 
its pursuit of those interests in the no-
ble rhetoric of combatting anti-
Semitism and def ending the ''little 
guy" (now one of the world's largest 
military powers), so much the better. 
Anti-Arab racism 
The role that anti-Arab racism plays 
is somehow more difficult to get a han-
dle on. Progressives, and this was true 
of the Mobe course participants as 
well, are often quite willing to admit 
that fear of anti-Semitism or of being 
labeled as anti-Semitic creates a barrier 
to their understanding of and political 
activity around the Palestinian/Israeli 
conflict. It's much more difficult to 
talk about the fact that a concurrent, 
and often unconscious, anti-Arab 
racism is usually at work as well. 
One of the more interesting aspects 
of this concerns the questions we don't 
ask -questions about Palestinian 
security, about Palestinian rights, 
about Arab perspectives in general. So 
often in the press and in our political 
work, questions are raised from a 
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remarkably Israel-focused perspective. 
Even many Middle East activists will 
argue that we should work for Pales-
tinian rights because Israel's security, 
Israel's democratic future, or Israel's 
economic viability depend on it. That's 
not a bad perspective in and of itself, 
but it is often not accompanied by any 
sort of parallel concern for the future 
of the Palestinian population. Whether 
or not a particular peace proposal is 
best for the Palestinians is really secon-
dary, just as Arabs in general are often 
perceived as secondary (or, at best, 
obstructionist) in a conflict that has 
left 4 million Palestinians stateless 
(half of those are now in exile) and 
many thousands dead since 1948. 
The Mobe course participants spent 
some time listing the uncensored im-
ages we have of Arabs, 
Palestinians and Muslims. The 
general tenor was not surprising: dirty, 
greedy, fanatic, terrorist, veiled. Even 
if nobody really believes that these 
stereotypes represent reality, we don't 
have much else to work with. Theim-
ages of Arabs presented in our popular 
media are more blatantly racist than 
any since those of the Japanese in 
World War II. It's hard to imagine 
how anyone who lived through the oil 
crisis in 1973 and the Iranian revolu-
tion of 1978 could not be affected by 
the deluge of stereotypes spewed forth 
by TV and in print: Arabs are fat, 
filthy rich sheiks drooling over "our" 
women while the Arab women remain 
hidden behind veils, or Muslims (Ira-
nians aren't Arabs but they'll do for 
the media) are skinny fanatics who hi-
jack, take hostages, and rant and rave 
about "infidel imperialism." These 
sort of racist images have very old 
roots in our society, and they remain 
acceptable today in a way that other 
racist propaganda does not. The flood 
rages on: this year's Rambo doll line 
up features a member of the 
S.A.V.A.G.E. international terror net-
work named Nomad-"he grew up 
without a home and now hates every-
thing and everybody.'' 
In more subtle ways, the anti-Arab 
racism of American society can affect 
our ability to make distinctions, to 
understand who Arabs and Palesti-
nians and Muslims are. Part of what 
paralyzes us around Middle East issues 
is the inability of large sectors of the 
progressive movement to distinguish 
between Arabs in general and Palesti-
nians in particular, or among the wide-
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ly divergent factions of the PLO, or 
between Arabs and Islam. 
The media and the Reagan ad-
ministration's manipulation of ter-
rorism provides an excellent example. 
To examine particulars: Our justifiable 
sadness and outrage at the killings in 
Rome and Vienna a year ago, or at the 
murder of 12 Jews in a synagogue in 
Turkey this September, is somehow 
translated into the sense that it's "us" 
and the Israelis against ''them,'' the 
terrorists. What is surprising to note 
here is not that Palestinian violence 
makes the headlines while Israeli 
violence on a grander scale does not: 
these particular Palestinians were seek-
ing headlines, were trying to get the at-
tention of the world, while the Israelis, 
bombing Palestinian refugee camps in 
"retaliatory" strikes, are aiming to 
punish Palestinian civilian populations 
while avoiding international publicity. 
And of course, the press is far more in-
tersted in the singular drama of the hi-
jacking, the synagogue bombing, etc. 
than in the weekly repetition of a few 
dozen Palestinian corpses lying in a 
refugee camp. 
What is important, and tragic, is 
that we don't know, and we allow 
ourselves not to know, that those acts 
of violence were condemned by the 
mainstream of the PLO and by the vast 
majority of Palestinians. Somehow 
those of us who have little difficulty in 
understanding the differences in 
political perspectives between, say, 
Gatsha Buthelezi and the ANC, or be-
tween Pope John Paul and the libera-
tion theologists, or even between 
Bachrach and Kennedy, have allowed 
ourselves to lump "Arabs" into an un-
differentiated mass that includes 
Arafat, Abu Nidal, refugee kids throw-
ing stones at Israeli patrols, and 
Muslim fundamentalist ''mobs'' about 
to riot in Cairo. 
None of us are really exempt from 
this. Even those of us who do Middle 
East work are guilty of "disappearing" 
Arabs and Arab Americans. A classic 
example occured last spring when a 
group of activists were planning a 
panel on the bombing of Libya. We 
thought of three possible speakers who 
were, it so happened, a Jew, a WASP, 
and an Arab-American. Without a se-
cond thought, we agreed that one of 
the first two speakers should address 
the section on U.S. policy toward 
Libya, since U.S. policy should be 
discussed by an American. It wasn't 
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until a few moments later that we 
realized that we had unwittingly 
assented to the belief that Arab-
Americans are not actually Americans 
like the rest of us. 
Again, both the United States and 
Israel have a stake in reinforcing racist 
stereotypes of Arabs. If we remain ig-
norant of the political and cultural 
realities of the Middle East, mobilized 
only by images of hatred and fear, we 
cannot provide much of an opposition 
to government policies. If we buy into 
the scenario of Israelis as peaceloving 
people besieged by fanatic terrorists, 
then we will understand that Israel 
MUST prevent the establishment of a 
Palestinian/terrorist state; the United 
States CANNOT recognize the right of 
the Palestinians to self-determination; 
Israel MUST establish a ''security 
zone" in the territories of southern 
Lebanon, etc. Reagan's anti-Quaddafi 
rhetoric went too far for most progres-
sives, but both the US and the Israeli 
governments use-and benefit 
from-the pervasive anti-Arab feeling 
in both societies. *(Just as the Left has 
confronted sexism, racism, and class-
ism within our ranks, we must-if we 
are to organize effectively on the Mid-
dle East-confront our own feelings 
about Arabs/Palestinians/Muslims.) 
Feminism 
Interestingly enough, the question 
that came up most often in the US 
Policy course concerned women in the 
Arab world. The media images are ex-
tremely powerful here: veiled women, 
Muslim men who keep four wives, or-
if we are following the most recent 
debates-female circumcision. One 
might view these concerns as the 
familiar first world/third world debate 
over defining women's issues, but it 
seems to be more than that. At some 
level, our concern as feminists is pro-
bably being reinforced by dark visions 
of Arabs as misogynists who force 
women into veils, or harems, or both. 
And Islam is understood to be a reli-
gion which is inherently oppressive, in-
evitably fundamentalist, and essential-
ly backward. 
In this case, it seems, our stereotypes 
about Muslims and Arabs are so 
powerful that we begin to ask ques-
tions with a very different intent than 
we ask questions about, say, women in 
Central America. For example: many 
of us have examined feminist and gay/ 
lesbian issues in Nicaragua, but we 
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have done so with a certain openmind-
edness, a willingness to seek out and 
support those who are leading the 
struggle in that society. When we look 
at Arab/Palestinian society (if we do), 
if seems we have often done so quite 
judgmentally, as if our purpose is to 
decide whether or not these folks are 
feminist enough for us. One can't help 
but wonder whether, again, Arab/Is-
lamic sexism isn't being used to justify 
a colonial mentality. Are we concerned 
first and foremost as feminists? Or are 
we, at some level, lured by those 
powerful, ugly myths into trying to 
decide whether or not "these people" 
deserve self-determination? 
It's not surprising that our images of 
Arabs are paralleled by the vision of 
Israel as a feminist haven-a land 
where women and men are equal part-
ners in the pioneering venture that 
created the state. Of course, whether or 
not that image of Israel is true ought to 
be irrelevant to our discussion about 
Arab/Palestinian women. But some-
how the comparison seems to hover 
over many discussions of ''women in 
the Arab world,'' as if we were trying 
to decide whether Arab women aren't 
better off under Israeli rule. (This 
argument is made quite forthrightly by 
some supporters of the Israeli occupa-
tion, who point out, for example, that 
Israel (unlike Jordan) gave Palestinian 
women on the West Bank and Gaza the 
right to vote. It's startling to realize 
that this sort of "gilded cage" argu-
ment carries as much weight as it does 
in our post-colonial era.) 
None of this is to argue that we can-
not or should not examine critically the 
very real oppression of women-as 
women-that continues in the Arab 
world and in Israel as elsewhere. In do-
ing so, there is much to be said about 
the role played by religion-Islam, 
Christianity, and Judaism-in the 
institutionalization of that oppression. 
But to do so with integrity, we must be 
able to make distinctions: Islam is not 
monolithic; and the role of women is a 
hotly debated topic in Muslim coun-
tries. The idea of a "Muslim feminist" 
is not inherently more incongruous 
than the idea of a "Catholic feminist." 
And feminist struggles are being waged 
by women in many Middle Eastern 
societies to confront sexism and to 
challenge the legal discrimination 
against them. Those struggles are as ex-
citing, and certainly as revolutionary, 
as anything happening in the United 
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States and Europe today. As feminists, 
we have tended to ignore those trends; 
but until we get past our own blind-
spots and start listening to the Arab 
women who are writing and organizing 
around women's issues, we cannot 
begin to assess how women have, and 
don't have, power in Middle Eastern 
societies. 
Conclusion 
Increasingly, the disarmament and 
anti-intervention movements have 
begun to see the importance of grappl-
ing with US involvement in the Middle 
East. The United States is supporting 
both Israel and the "moderate" Arab 
governments with billions of dollars 
worth of highly sophisticated arms as 
well as other aid. And the US govern-
ment has poured vast resources into de-
veloping an extensive network of 
bases, Rapid Deployment forces, and 
other interventionary capabilities. At 
least six times since 1945, the United 
States has threatened the use of nuclear 
weapons in the Middle East. (In 1973, 
the US forces were on full nuclear 
alert.) 
So far, the US government has 
managed to maintain hegemony fairly 
successfully: the Soviets are weak in 
the Middle East, most of the major oil 
resources are in the hands of 
"friendly" governments, nationalist 
and radical movements have been 
largely unsuccessful, and Israel is the 
strongest military and economic power 
in the region. 
But the risks of maintaining that 
policy are enormous, and the parallels 
with US interventionist policy in other 
regions of the world are too disturbing 
to ignore. For the peace movement, 
understanding of the US role in the 
Middle East and speaking out about it 
have become necessities. It is crucial 
that we look at events in the Middle 
East in some of the same terms, and 
with the same critical perspectives, that 
we use for events in South Africa or 
Central America (without, of course, 
ignoring the specifics and the distinc-
tions). We also need to articulate the 
links among issues, to make the 
connections necessary for a more uni-
fied and coherent peace movement. 
And increasingly, disarmament and 
anti-intervention activists are doing 
just that. In Boston, anti-intervention 
groups like Mobilization for Survival 
and peace organizations like the 
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Eviction Free Zone, c/o City Life, 335 
Lamartine St., Jamaica Plain, MA 
02130. 
In response to unprecedented 
displacement of poor and not-so-poor 
residents of Boston neighborhoods 
Jamaica Plain and Roxbury, City Life, 
a tenants' rights group, has launched 
an Eviction Free Zone Coalition which 
includes several other pro-tenant 
organizations. It is a bold initiative to 
fight evictions, aid low-income 
homeowners, and find long-term solu-
tions to displacement, such as 
cooperative housing. Within the target 
area, they plan to educate tenants to 
their rights, organize tenants so they 
can respond as a group wherever possi-
ble, and when necessary, provide legal 
backup through a local legal services 
center. In less than a year the group has 
organized several major actions in 
Jamaica Plain and Roxbury and have 
reached over 200 people threatened by 
displacement. Reports have shown that 
housing prices in Jamaica Plain have 
recently risen faster than in any other 
neighborhood in the country and 
Money Magazine has rated Jamaica 
Plain as one of the most lucrative areas 
in the country to invest in. Many hous-
ing activists in the area feel that the 
creation of an eviction free zone will 
scare off potential speculators and lux-
ury condo developers who have been 
fueling the housing crisis. A Resist 
grant went towards a stipend for a te-
nant organizer for the Hispanic com-
munity within the eviction free zone. 
Take Back the Night Coalition, 78 
North Marengo Ave., Pasadena, CA 
91109. 
The Take Back the Night Coalition 
is a group of organizations represen-
ting anti-violence and feminist move-
ments and communities ot color in Los 
Angeles. It was formed in solidarity 
with the Black Coalition Fighting Back 
Serial Murders, a community group 
which was organized in January, 1986, 
out of concern for the murders of at 
least 17 women, most of whom are 
Black, in South Central L.A.; in 
respons<" to the violence committed 
against women of color, immigrant 
and refugee women; and in protest of 
the violence that threatens women each 
day of our lives. 
Violence against women of color, 
immigrant, undocumented and refugee 
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women in L.A. is largely unreported 
and ignored, adding to their already 
multiple burdens of racism, sexism and 
economic oppression. 
The purpose of the Take Back the 
Night Coalition is to support women in 
communities of color working on these 
issues, to raise public awareness that 
violence against any women is violence 
against all women, and to apply pres-
sure to those officials who wield the 
power to change these intolerable situ-
ations. 
Their work, since June, 1986, has 
been on several levels. They've held 
weekly vigils in front of police head-
quarters in downtown Los Angeles, 
demanding a meeting with the Black 
Coalition Fighting Back Serial 
Murders. They have also become 
"regulars" on the local Thursday even-
ing newscasts. Thus, these vigils have 
focused much-needed media attention 
on the unsolved murders, which have 
not been widely publicized. They are 
currently planning a public forum on 
"Race, Rape, and Violence Against 
Women," and their largest project is a 
"Take Back the Night March," which 
took place October 25. Resist's grant 
paid for some of the expenses of the 
march. 
Thank You! 
A few months ago we put out a special 
request for funds so that Resist could 
buy its own (much nee~ed) computer, 
since we had been sharing an antique 
model with several other movement 
groups for many years. We had a tre-
mendous response!! Lotus Inc. 
donated a used IBM PC and you, our 
readers, contributed another $850 
which was used to buy a printer and a 
monitor. The system is now set up in 
our office and ready to go. We would 
like to make one more special request. 
We have determined that we will need 
to spend an additional $1,500 on soft-
ware, most of it going to a donor-bank 
program that was developed by folks at 
the Funding Exchange. If you would 
like to respond to this special request 
please fill out the form below and send 
whatever you cart afford. We'll keep 
you posted on our progress. 
Name ____________ _ 
Address __________ _ 
Amount Donated _______ _ 
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Intervention Consensus 
Continued from page Five 
watch out for its interests. Moreover, 
the NLF, made up of communists and 
noncommunists, also had a genuinely 
separate identity during this period. It 
pledged that the postliberation re-
unification between North and South 
would be carried out in deliberate 
stages, and that South Vietnam would 
pursue a neutralist foreign policy. 
Neutralism, however, was anathema to 
Cold War liberalism, and the NLF was 
treated simply as a proxy for the North 
Vietnamese communist regime. By the 
early 1970s, moreover, U.S. assassina-
tion and terror programs had greatly 
reduced the strength of the NLF and 
thus its independence from the North. 
Middle East Issues 
Continued from page Seven 
American Friends Service Committee 
work closely with Jewish organizations 
(New Jewish Agenda) and with Palesti-
nian solidarity groups (the Middle 
East Solidarity Committee). Recently 
several Middle East groups co-
sponsored an event on Israel's link to 
Central America with the Central 
American Solidarity Association, and 
activists from many areas have begun 
to accept, as a matter of course, that 
the Middle East will be on the agenda 
at multi-issue demonstrations and dis-
cussions. After the bombing of Libya, 
an ad-hoc group of disarmament 
groups got together to discuss how to 
respond and began by arranging for 
speakers on the issue to appear on 
several local radio talk shows. There 
are encouraging signs throughout the 
progressive community, and reasons to 
believe that, in Boston as elsewhere, 
the peace activists are no longer willing 
or able to wrap Middle East issues in a 
veil of silence. 
Melani McAlister is on the staff of 
Boston Mobilization for Survival, a 
recipient of several Resist grants over 
the years. The views expressed here are 
her own and not necessarily those of 
the organization. 
November 1986 
